Selecting University Technology Transfer Modes: An Examination of Biotechnology Firms’ Entrepreneurial Orientation by Kirkman, Dorothy Mary
189
ISSN: 0718-2724. (http://www.jotmi.org) 
Journal of Technology Management & Innovation © Universidad Alberto Hurtado, Facultad de Economía y Negocios.
Received March 30, 2013 / Accepted May 3, 2013 J. Technol. Manag. Innov. 2013, Volume 8, Issue 2
Selecting University Technology Transfer Modes: An Examination of 
Biotechnology Firms’ Entrepreneurial Orientation
Dorothy M. Kirkman
Abstract
Universities use technology transfer to disseminate groundbreaking knowledge to biotechnology firms. Each transfer 
mode—licensing, sponsored contract research, and consulting arrangements —offers biotechnology firms an opportunity 
to acquire a unique bundle of knowledge and resources. This study proposes that an entrepreneurial orientation (EO) may 
influence a firm’s selection of a specific technology transfer mode. An EO reflects a firm’s willingness to innovate, take 
risks, and become a first mover. This strategic orientation may guide managers to select a transfer mode that not only fits 
a firm’s needs but also enables it to gain an advantage. This study uses multinomial logistic regression to examine how a 
DBF’s innovativeness, proactiveness, and risk taking influence a DBF’s transfer mode selection.
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Introduction
Universities, as knowledge creators and disseminators, 
primarily utilize three forms of technology transfer to dis-
seminate a broad spectrum of knowledge and resources 
to dedicated biotechnology firms (DBFs). At one end of 
the spectrum, DBFs use licenses to acquire and translate 
cutting-edge university inventions (Hoang and Rothaermel, 
2010) into prototypes or patents (Rothaermel and Deeds, 
2004). At the other end of the spectrum, DBFs may seek to 
hire university faculty as consultants, who offer advice, solve 
problems, or test new ideas (Perkmann and Walsh, 2008).
In the center is sponsored contract research, which occurs 
when a firm contracts with a university scientist to explore 
specific aspects of an applied problem (Perkmann and Walsh, 
2007). This form of technology transfer is a combination of 
licensing and consulting. Contract research is similar to li-
censing because it might lead to the creation of new knowl-
edge that results in a patent (Link, Siegel, and Bozeman, 
2007) and it has elements of consulting agreements because 
it involves hiring an academic scientist to solve a problem 
(Tornatzky, Waugaman, and Gray, 1999). By establishing links 
with universities, DBFs gain access to externally conducted 
research that provides them with the opportunity to en-
hance their R&D capabilities.
Although each mode of university technology transfer is a 
heterogeneous bundle of knowledge resources that pro-
vides DBFs with unique benefits, a review of university-in-
dustry studies reveals that few studies have examined the 
factors that motivate a DBF to select one transfer mode 
over other the modes. When managers select the manner 
in which their firm will interact with another firm, this deci-
sion influences (a) the type of relationship that will develop 
between the firms and (b) the type of resources that can 
be exchanged between them. Alliance research has explored 
partner selection (Bierly and Gallagher, 2007; Gulati, 1995; Li, 
et al., 2008a) and governance structure selection (Contrac-
tor and Ra, 2002; Coombs, Bierly, and Gallagher, 2012; Teng 
and Das, 2008). Since each university technology transfer 
mode disseminates unique forms of scientific and techno-
logical knowledge, DBFs should seek to select the mode that 
best fits their R&D needs because they do not possess the 
slack resources to absorb a selection mistake.
This paper examines the following research question: What 
factors influence a DBF’s selection of a university technol-
ogy transfer mode? DBFs are independent, for-profit firms 
involved in creating human health therapies (Powell, et al., 
2005). Universities are critical sourcing partners because 
they provide DBFs with a window to access new scientif-
ic discoveries (George, Zahra, and Wood, 2002) and each 
mode of technology transfer provides DBFs with a bundle of 
knowledge and resources they can use to complement their 
internal R&D process.
To explore this question, the current paper investigates 
the role that an entrepreneurial orientation (hereafter EO) 
plays in helping DBFs select a university technology transfer 
mode. EO reflects a firm’s ability to recognize and exploit 
opportunities, take risks, and experiment with novel tech-
nologies (Covin and Slevin, 1989; Miller, 1983; Wiklund, 1999; 
Wiklund and Shepherd, 2003). The prevailing sentiment is 
that a firm’s EO may positively influence its performance 
or ability to gain an advantage (Lumpkin and Dess, 2001; 
Wiklund, 1999). Arguably, this advantage may extend to se-
lecting knowledge resources.
Empirical studies reveal that an EO positively supports 
knowledge-based activities such as learning (Wang, 2008), 
innovation sourcing (Pérez-Luño, Wiklund, and Cabrera, 
2011), promoting innovation (Wu, Chang, and Chen, 2008), 
and alliance portfolio development (Marino, et al., 2002). Ac-
cording to Minniti and Bygrave (2001), “entrepreneurship is 
a process of learning” (p. 7). Entrepreneurial firms foster cul-
tures that are conducive to organizational learning (Zahra, 
Nielsen, and Bogner, 1999) by supporting experimentation 
and novel solutions to problems, doing what is necessary to 
achieve goals, and maintaining interorganizational relation-
ships to secure resources (Lumpkin and Dess, 1996; Marino, 
et al., 2002). Entrepreneurial behaviors might motivate a 
DBF’s managers to select transfer modes that support learn-
ing, drug development, and adaptation.
This paper uses Lumpkin and Dess’ (2001) conceptualiza-
tion of EO as a multidimensional construct to explore how 
DBFs decide to participate in a license, sponsored contract 
research, or consulting agreement. The multidimensional EO 
approach suggests that a firm can possess one or all three 
dimensions and be entrepreneurial. Furthermore, Lumpkin 
and Dess (1996, 2001) have contended that each dimension 
is not universally advantageous. For example, a DBF might 
benefit from being innovative in one situation but in another 
context, imitation might be advantageous. The multidimen-
sional approach differs from the traditional conceptualiza-
tion of EO as a gestalt (Miller, 1983) in which a firm must 
possess all three dimensions to be entrepreneurial. The cur-
rent study adopts the multidimensional perspective for two 
reasons. First, many DBFs are resource-constrained firms 
and creating full-scale EO is resource-intensive (Hughes and 
Morgan, 2007). Second, small firms such as those in the bio-
technology industry have limited resources but must still act 
entrepreneurially to navigate their challenging environments.
This study contributes to existing literature in the following 
ways. There is a rich stream of alliance research that de-
picts how firms select alliance governance structures. This 
study is a novel attempt at cross-fertilization by exploring 
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scholarly exploration of the EO-performance relationship 
(Lumpkin and Dess, 2001). It is conceivable, given the mixed 
results, that EO may be beneficial under some conditions 
but not others (Hughes and Morgan, 2007).
The multidimensional approach to EO draws attention to 
contingency theory, which suggests that there is no one best 
way to organize or strategize and that organizations should 
make decisions that fit their circumstances (Donaldson, 
2001). In a turbulent environment, adaptation is important 
to survival (Daft, 1989). This study employs the multidimen-
sional approach because it promotes flexibility and adapta-
tion. At any time, the managers of a small- or medium-sized 
business (SME) may have to choose which entrepreneurial 
activities to pursue in order to benefit the firm (Lubatkin, 
et al., 2006).
EO Dimensions
Research has identified innovativeness, proactiveness, and 
risk taking as the behaviors that highlight firm-level entre-
preneurship. Innovativeness reflects a firm’s propensity to 
engage in new idea generation, experimentation, and R&D 
activities resulting in new products and processes (Lumpkin 
and Dess, 1996). Proactiveness reflects a forward-looking 
perspective where companies actively seek to anticipate 
opportunities to develop and introduce new products to 
obtain first-mover advantages and shape the direction of the 
environment (Hughes and Morgan, 2007). DBFs can achieve 
first-mover advantages (Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988) 
by (a) winning patent or learning races (Silverman and 
Baum, 2002) or (b) exploiting social connections to secure 
resources or gain access to alliance opportunities (Ahuja, 
2000; Stram and Elfring, 2008). Risk taking highlights a firm’s 
proclivity to support projects in which the expected returns 
are uncertain (Lumpkin and Dess, 1996). Interorganizational 
collaborations are risky endeavors because collaborating 
firms often have different expectations and goals that lead to 
conflict and missed opportunities to acquire resources and 
knowledge, and to learn new capabilities. DBFs that possess 
an entrepreneurial disposition seek to gain an advantage by 
creating or acquiring knowledge. Universities are often col-
laboration partners because they are the source of scientific 
discoveries in the biotechnology industry.
Knowledge and University Technology Transfer
The knowledge-based view of the firm (KBV) puts forth the 
notion that firms exist to coordinate and leverage special-
ized internal knowledge to gain an advantage (Grant, 1996). 
Knowledge is an important asset because firms can leverage 
its unique characteristics to develop and maintain an advan-
tage. Generally, knowledge is segmented into two categories: 
explicit and tacit. Explicit knowledge is operational knowl-
this phenomenon within university-industry relationships. 
Furthermore, existing studies either focus on the process 
of transferring technology from academia to industry (Cy-
ert and Goodman, 1997; Santoro and Gopalakrishnan, 2001) 
or a specific mode of technology transfer such as licensing 
or consulting agreements (Kirkman and Phillips, 2012; Perk-
mann and Walsh, 2008; Sine, Shane, and Di Gregorio, 2003). 
This study concurrently examines three common forms 
of university technology transfer to offer insight into the 
unique contribution that each mode makes in supporting 
DBFs’ drug development activities.
The next section provides a theoretical platform that ex-
plores EO and university technology transfer as knowledge-
based activities and then uses this theory to develop the 
hypotheses in the third section. After reporting and sum-
marizing the results, the discussion then puts forth ideas for 
future research, and identifies the study’s limitations.
Literature Review
Entrepreneurial Orientation
Entrepreneurial orientation reflects the methods, practices, 
and decision-making styles managers use to act entrepre-
neurially and may be a strategic orientation because it cap-
tures how a firm intends to compete (Lumpkin and Dess, 
1996). EO highlights how managers make strategic choices 
that enable their firms to adapt to the environment in an 
effort to achieve its goals and objectives. It highlights a firm’s 
willingness to take business risks, promote innovation, and 
aggressively seek opportunities in order to obtain a compet-
itive advantage (Covin and Slevin, 1989). It is an embedded 
capability that resides in organizational routines and pro-
cesses (Lee, Lee, and Pennings, 2001). Miller (1983) created 
EO as a medium to assess firm-level entrepreneurial behav-
iors, but there is a scholarly debate concerning the nature 
and the composition of the construct.
On the one hand, some researchers (Covin and Slevin, 1989; 
Miller, 1983) have argued that EO is a unidimensional con-
struct and the dimensions covary. This perspective suggests 
that a firm must possess all three dimensions originally put 
forth by Miller—innovativeness, proactiveness, and risk tak-
ing—to act entrepreneurially. On the other hand, some 
scholars (Dess, Lumpkin, and Covin, 1997; Lumpkin and 
Dess, 1996, 2001) have argued that EO is a multidimensional 
construct and a firm does not have to possess all the entre-
preneurial characteristics to engage in new entry. In support 
of Lumpkin and Dess’ (1996, 2001) multidimensional EO ap-
proach, Hughes and Morgan (2007) contended that the orig-
inal version of EO “neglects the individual influence of each 
dimension and assumes a universal and uniform influence 
by each dimension” (p. 652). This assumption may explain 
the inconsistent results that emerge from over 30 years of 
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offers them access to new scientific ideas and trends (Niosi, 
2003).
In summary, EO is a strategic posture that encourages DBFs 
to engage in advantage-seeking behaviors by taking risks and 
doing things differently. Since it may take nearly decade to 
profit from their R&D investments, DBFs with an entrepre-
neurial disposition might be able to leverage their capabili-
ties to secure the resources that are necessary to survive. 
The following discussion presents the hypotheses.
Hypotheses
Innovativeness
The development of new products involves extensive and 
intensive knowledge activities (Li, et al., 2008b) that re-
quire DBFs to possess and gain access to a broad range 
of knowledge in order to become competitive (DeCarolis 
and Deeds, 1999). To innovate, DBFs make significant invest-
ments in the “R” part of R&D (Zahra, 1996), which involves 
exploration—the pursuit of knowledge, of things that might 
come to be known (Levinthal and March, 1993, p. 105). Dur-
ing the exploration process, innovative firms solve prob-
lems, learn, and create new knowledge and capabilities. In 
innovative DBFs, managers support novel problem solving, 
encourage employees to embrace new ideas (Abbey and 
Dickson, 1983), and discard old ways of doing things.
Given innovative DBFs’ focus on exploring new knowledge 
and exploring new ways of doing things, these DBFs might 
not sponsor faculty research. Innovative DBFs possess ex-
ploratory capabilities that allow them to perform novel 
research without faculty assistance. These firms might be 
more attracted to licenses because most university inven-
tions are acquired in the early stage when significant devel-
opment work is required (Agrawal, 2006; Cohen, Nelson, 
and Walsh, 2002). Innovative DBFs possess the capabilities 
to make sense of the core technologies used to create a 
university invention and then transform it into a replicable 
prototype that can be licensed out or used as the basis 
to form a joint development project with pharmaceutical 
firms.
Although an innovative DBF might not sponsor faculty 
research, it may use consulting agreements to secure sup-
port when solving complex research problems. Research 
has revealed that consulting agreements helped firms com-
plete existing projects (Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh, 2002). 
Therefore,
Hypothesis 1: Innovative DBFs are more likely to partici-
pate in licensing and consulting agreements than sponsored 
contract research.
edge that resides in manuals or procedures (Grant, 1996). 
Tacit knowledge is defined as the implicit accumulation of 
skills that results from learning by doing (Simonin, 1999). 
Tacit knowledge is a valuable resource because it resides in 
the mind of an employee and is sticky, which makes it dif-
ficult to copy and transfer (Szulanski, 1996). It is difficult to 
articulate in terms that would be easily understood by oth-
ers. The value of tacit knowledge is uncertain, with the high-
est uncertainty applying to development activities (Bercovitz 
and Feldmann, 2006). KBV would motivate DBFs to acquire 
valuable knowledge assets that it can use to create and sus-
tain an advantage. Technology transfer offers DBFs access to 
academic scientists’ valuable tacit knowledge.    
Universities rely on their scientists whose research is typi-
cally at the frontiers of science and leads to theoretical and 
methodological advances and the invention of devices (Etz-
kowitz, 1998, p. 826). Scientists acquire knowledge through 
experimentation and seek to discover knowledge as an 
end in itself (Gieryn, 1983, p. 786). They possess knowledge 
stocks that consist of basic science, research “know-how” 
that involves their expertise in a specific scientific or tech-
nological area (Kachra and White, 2008), and latent knowl-
edge that includes intuition about the inner workings of a 
technical system (Agrawal, 2006). Universities use technol-
ogy transfer to disseminate this tacit knowledge to DBFs.
Technology Transfer Modes
Licenses, sponsored contract research, and consulting agree-
ments are three common modes of technology transfer. Li-
censes involve selling a company the rights to use a univer-
sity’s inventions in return for revenue in the form of upfront 
fees at the time of closing the deal, and annual, ongoing roy-
alty payments that are contingent upon the commercial suc-
cess of the technology in a downstream market (Feldman, 
et al., 2002). When licensing an invention, a firm is purchas-
ing know-how in the form of a patent (Agrawal, 2006). A 
license provides a DBF an opportunity to develop an inven-
tion that is protected by a patent. By doing so, the firm can 
benefit from the temporary right to exploit new knowledge 
without any competition. Sponsored contract research oc-
curs when a faculty member agrees to accomplish specific 
research, and the company agrees to pay the university to 
do so (Tornatzky, Waugaman, and Gray, 1999). When spon-
soring a faculty member’s research, a DBF gains access to a 
team’s research expertise that results from a combination of 
years of research experience, faculty expertise, and admin-
istrative and other processes (Markman, Siegel, and Wright, 
2008). Consulting arrangements occur when a firm hires an 
academic scientist to perform a service. Hiring a university 
faculty member as a consultant provides DBFs with oppor-
tunities to acquire the scientist’s tacit knowledge through 
frequent interactions (Perkmann and Walsh, 2008) as well as 
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ing without pursuing commercial activities; therefore, some 
inventions may be lacking in quality.
When sponsoring faculty research, the tacit nature of the 
output makes it difficult to administer and control the in-
teraction by using a contract (Howells, Gagliardi, and Malik, 
2008). Incomplete contracts can lead to adverse selection 
and moral hazard problems. Adverse selection refers to the 
misrepresentation of ability by the agent (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
For example, junior faculty members may actively pursue 
industry research contracts but lack experience using basic 
science to solve industrial problems (D’Este and Perkmann, 
2011). Moral hazard involves the sellers’ decision to pursue 
their agenda (Dechenaux, Thursby, and Thursby, 2009) by 
taking the output generated while working with one client 
and using it, without permission, when working with another 
firm (Howells, Gagliardi, and Malik, 2008).
Conversely, consulting agreements may be less risky be-
cause (a) a DBF does not have to make an investment be-
fore acquiring academic knowledge, (b) these arrangements 
are often short-term (Agrawal, 2006), and (c) scientists can 
use their existing knowledge to offer advice (Dechenaux, 
Thursby, and Thursby, 2009), thereby reducing the possibility 
of adverse selection. 
Based on this argument,
Hypothesis 3: A DBF’s risk taking is more strongly associated 
with a sponsored contract research and licensing agreement 
than a consulting agreement.
Methods
Setting and Sampling Frame
The biotechnology industry is the setting for this study. By 
definition, biotech is knowledge intensive, which means that 
the complementary processes of discovery and innovation 
necessitate the union of assets that characterize different 
types of organizations—both public and private (Feldman, 
et al., 2002). Drug development requires information from 
a variety of interorganizational interactions (Bercovitz and 
Feldmann, 2006). University discoveries played a major role 
in the founding of the industry and remain a critical source 
of new knowledge (Prevezer, 1997). The sampling frame 
for this study included biotechnology firms located in the 
United States. This research focuses on domestic firms be-
cause most of the commercialized biotechnology products 
emerged from the United States (Shan and Song, 1997).
A three-step process was employed to identify firms in 
the sample. First, a list of potential respondents was drawn 
from nonprofit biotechnology associations’ directories and 
HOOVERs business data to access publically traded firms. 
Proactiveness
Proactive DBFs continuously scan the market looking for 
technological opportunities to help them become a first 
mover and gain entrepreneurial advantages. For a DBF to 
recognize a valuable technology, it must possess a certain 
level of technological capabilities. Kirzner (1979) called this 
phenomenon entrepreneurial alertness, or the spontane-
ous process in which individuals differ in their capacity to 
identify or recognize opportunities. At the firm level, this 
phenomenon refers to absorptive capacity (Cohen and Lev-
inthal, 1990) or an organization’s ability to identify and lever-
age external knowledge.
Licensing is a transfer opportunity that allows DBFs to ex-
ploit their prior knowledge to gain access to an invention 
that will help the firm secure an advantage or profits (Stuart, 
Ozdemir, and Ding, 2007). Exploitation involves leveraging 
those routines and behaviors that underlie current com-
petencies (Lubatkin, et al., 2006). A DBF’s prior experience 
working with a technology or exploring a specific scientific 
area implies that a firm has the capabilities to develop this 
technology and it will not shelve it or shirk its developmen-
tal responsibilities (Dechenaux, Thursby, and Thursby, 2009).
Searching for first-mover opportunities, proactive DBFs 
might also be attracted to sponsored contract research. 
Sponsored research provides a DBF access to a universi-
ty’s lab (Tornatzky, et al., 1999), graduate students as po-
tential new hires (Perkmann and Walsh, 2007), and the 
ability to acquire newly developed knowledge in the form 
of new processes and technologies that can be used as 
inputs to develop new projects. Sponsored contract re-
search offers DBFs opportunities to acquire new knowl-
edge to gain an advantage in the future while licensing 
offers DBFs an opportunity to gain an advantage today. 
Therefore,
Hypothesis 2: A DBF’s proactiveness is more strongly asso-
ciated with licensing and sponsored contract research than 
with a consulting agreement.
Risk Taking
Firms with a propensity for risk taking move boldly into new 
and uncertain ventures (Lumpkin and Dess, 1996). Without a 
propensity to take risks, a firm’s management team may wait 
to act on a new venture until all the uncertainty has dissipat-
ed. Licensing and sponsored contract research include a high 
level of uncertainty. Regarding licensing, there is no guaran-
tee that the university invention has commercial potential. 
A DBF can pay fees only to discover they have acquired a 
“lemon” license. Jensen, Thursby, and Thursby (2003) argued 
that high-quality faculty possess the ability to secure fund-
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The questionnaire was administered using Dillman’s (1978) 
method of mail survey response and design, which suggests 
that researchers send pre-notification letters, a question-
naire package, and several follow-up reminders to potential 
respondents to increase survey response rates. A retired 
R&D executive provided advice regarding the content of the 
pre-notification letters, questionnaire package, and remind-
ers. Three mailings, sent 6 weeks apart, were administered to 
collect questionnaire responses. The lag time between the 
mailings was necessary to collect responses and update the 
database with new firm information. A total of 990 surveys 
were mailed to eligible respondents. The distribution of the 
mailings is as follows: 680 surveys sent in the first mailing, 
225 in the second mailing, and 85 in the final mailing. In total, 
204 responses were received but six were deleted due to 
missing data, leaving 198 responding firms. This analysis in-
cludes 171 of the responding firms because 27 firms did not 
participate in university-industry interactions.
The survey administration achieved a response rate of 
19.8%, which compares favorably with survey response rates 
of other studies of small firms—for example, 15% (Lee, Lee, 
and Pennings, 2001). Studies of small firms typically have low 
response rates because the CEO must personally respond 
to the survey since there are few others knowledgeable 
enough to assume the task (Bartholomew and Smith, 2006).
In survey research, the timing or lack of responses from cer-
tain groups is important and may increase the potential of 
a response bias. Some researchers analyzed early and late 
responses using t tests, which are used to identify signifi-
cant differences between two groups of respondents. Linder, 
Murphy, and Briers (2001) conducted meta-analysis studies 
which revealed that 114 (37.5%) of the 304 studies con-
ducted used some form of nonresponse analysis. The degree 
of nonresponse bias depends on two factors: the percent-
age of the sample that does not respond and the extent to 
which nonresponders differ systematically from the study 
population (Barclay, et al., 2002). I used t tests to determine 
whether there was any nonresponse bias in my study.
I conducted an independent-sample t test to compare public 
firms that responded to the survey and public firms that did 
not respond. I compared the two groups by comparing the 
means of public firms that responded and means of public 
firms that did not respond. I used firm size because it is easy 
to obtain such data from public online sources. The findings 
of this t test revealed no significant difference in firm size 
for responding public firms (M = 146.40, SD = 259.59) and 
nonresponding public firms (M = 104.60, SD = 121.94). Addi-
tional t tests were conducted to assess bias among late and 
early respondents. These results are consistent with findings 
of Linder et al.’s (2001) meta-analysis of survey research. The 
analysis revealed that found 75% of studies they analyzed ex-
hibited no differences between early and late respondents. 
The results from additional t tests are listed in Table 1.
This step identified 1,000 potential respondents. The second 
step involved classifying biotechnology firms by their North 
American Industry Classification Scheme codes. Those NA-
ICS codes that emphasized research and development of 
human health biotechnology products (NAICS 325411: Me-
dicinal and botanical manufacturing; NAICS 325414: Other 
biological product manufacturing; and NAICS 541710: Physi-
cal, engineering and biological research) were identified as 
the most useful and appropriate. Biotechnology studies 
(Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004) have examined phenomena 
in therapy- or drug-producing DBFs because these firms en-
counter specific resources and regulatory challenges when 
commercializing new products (Hoang and Rothaermel, 
2005). These challenges lead biotechnology firms to seek ex-
ternal knowledge. In the third step, each firm’s phone num-
ber, address, and NAICS code was verified using Reference 
USA (now called A-to-Z database), a library search engine 
that contains 12 million business listings and includes ad-
dress, firm size, founding date, and NAICS codes. After veri-
fication of each firm’s information, the final sample included 
838 biotechnology firms.
Data Collection
Because technology transfer mode selection has received 
scant attention, a multimethod approach was used to collect 
data. Semistructured interviews were conducted with direc-
tors of technology transfer offices (UTTOs) at five U.S. uni-
versities. Since many DBFs emerged from academic settings, 
interviews with UTTO directors provided an understanding 
of specific technology transfer modes and how DBFs use 
them to address their strategic needs. Third, literature re-
views were conducted following interviews and scales were 
selected.
A questionnaire was used to collect data for variables in this 
study. Since the questions focused on the firm’s technology 
strategy, the questionnaire was mailed to the senior execu-
tive responsible for R&D, such as president and CEO, vice 
president of R&D, or vice president of scientific discovery. In 
small firms, the head of R&D is the primary source and per-
haps the only source that is knowledgeable about the firm’s 
transfer activities (Norburn, 1989). The following profile of 
responding DBFs emerged (some of the profile variables 
were not included in this study): The responding firms were 
9 years old, 77% were located in biotechnology clusters, 75% 
were founded by academic scientists, 40% had prior links 
with their current university partner, and 68% were private 
firms that spent $10.2 million in R&D over a 3-year period. 
The average responding firm participated in 10 university 
linkages in 5 years (2.5 sponsored contract research, 2.5 li-
censing agreements, and 4.6 consulting agreements).
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mercial success of the technology in a downstream market 
(Feldman, et al., 2002, p. 107).
• Consulting agreements constitute an arrangement 
in which a faculty member accepts an engagement, on a pri-
vate basis, with a company that needs expert advice (Tor-
natzky, Waugaman, and Gray, 1999, p. 20).
• Sponsored contract research pertain to a single 
project or a group of closely related research tasks spon-
sored by one company at one university. The university 
agrees to accomplish specific research, and the company 
agrees to pay the university to do so (Tornatzky, Waugaman, 
and Gray, 1999, p. 13).
Independent Variables
Entrepreneurial orientation reflects the extent to which 
top managers are inclined to take business-related risks, to 
favor change and innovation in order to obtain a competi-
tive advantage for their firm (Covin and Slevin, 1989). This 
study uses a resource-based conceptualization of EO, which 
is consistent with Lyon, Lumpkin, and Dess’ (2000) analysis 
of the EO construct and related research. A resource-based 
approach reflects the notion that resources drive both stra-
tegic and entrepreneurial behavior. Various resource concep-
tualizations of EO have been used. Pérez-Luño, Wiklund, and 
Cabrera (2011) operationalized innovativeness by assessing 
Measures
The survey was pretested with MBA alumni and pilot tested 
at three biotechnology firms. The survey was revised based 
on the pretest and pilot test responses. Pilot DBFs were 
excluded from the final survey administration. The pretest 
and pilot test feedback focused on cosmetic issues such as 
length, white space, and order of the scales. The questions 
are listed in Table 2.
Dependent Variable
Technology transfer mode reflects a DBF’s preferred univer-
sity technology transfer mode. Respondents were asked to 
identify their firm’s preferred form of university technology 
transfer from a list that included licensing, sponsored con-
tract research, consulting agreements, and not applicable—
no university links. There was one preferred mode of uni-
versity technology transfer associated with each responding 
firm. Each responding firm’s preference was recoded into 
a categorical variable, with licenses coded as 1, sponsored 
contract research coded as 2, and consulting agreements 
coded as 3.
• Licensing agreements involve selling a company the 
rights to use a university’s inventions in return for revenue in 
the form of upfront fees at the time of closing the deal and 
annual, ongoing royalty payments contingent upon the com-
Table 1. Assessment of Response Bias Using t Test.
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part of the country, there was no group consensus used 
to identify the most appropriate measure. The measures 
used in this study each received a rating of 5 from each 
reviewer. Their feedback indicated that the measures used 
in this study accurately reflected actual industry practices. In 
addition, a factor analysis was conducted to determine the 
validity of the scales. The analysis produced three factors, 
each with an eigenvalue over 1, which accounted for 42% of 
the variance. The highest factor accounted for 18% of the ac-
cumulated variance. Since the first factor did not explain the 
majority of the variance in the variables (Podsakoff & Organ, 
1986, p. 536), common method bias was not a significant 
concern. The EO measures are listed below.
Innovativeness highlights a firm’s use of methods through 
which new ideas, routines, or prototypes are developed 
(McFadyen and Cannella, 2004). In this study, patents were 
used to assess a firm’s innovativeness. Patents have been 
widely used as a proxy for knowledge creation and innova-
the number of new products a firm had created over the last 
5 years. Hitt, Hoskisson, and Kim (1997) used R&D intensity 
as a proxy for innovation. Resource-based measures tend 
to have high reliability; however, issues may arise regarding 
the validity of the measure (Lyon, Lumpkin, and Dess, 2000).
To address possible validity concerns, three reviewers rated 
the measures to determine content validity. Reviewer #1 is 
a distinguished professor in biotechnology at a Research 1 
university. Reviewer #2 has been involved with three start-
up firms and currently owns a biotechnology-consulting 
firm. Finally, Reviewer #3 is currently the CEO of a start-up 
biotechnology firm.
I conducted a literature review and identified three meas-
ures that had been used to assess a firm’s innovativeness, 
proactiveness, and risk taking. The measures and their de-
scriptions were sent to the reviewers, who rated the meas-
ures using a Likert-type scale ranging from 5 (relevant) to 1 
(not relevant). Since each reviewer was located in a different 












•	 What form of university technology transfer does your firm prefer (Please 
Select One): (a) Licensing, (b) Sponsored Contract Research, (c) Consulting 
Agreements, (d) Not Applicable (No University Links)
•	 How many approved patents ___ and patent applications____ are associated with 
your firm?
•	 Please indicate the number of projects your firm currently has in clinical devel-
opment:
•	 Phase I: First testing of a potential new drug or therapy in 20-80 human 
subjects.
•	 Phase II: Large group testing (100-300) of the drug or therapy’s effective-
ness and safety.
•	 Phase III: Large group testing (1000-3000) to determine the drug or ther-
apy’s effectiveness, monitor side effects, and collect data that will allow the 
drug or treatment to be used safely.
•	 Projects approved by the FDA.
•	 Please group your firm’s projects into the categories listed below (Fill in the 
number):
•	 _________ Projects using the same underlying core technology that can be 
leveraged by other projects.
•	 __________ Projects using unique technologies that cannot be used in other 
projects.
•	 __________Total Projects
•	 How old is your firm (Please estimate)? a. Years __ b. Months _
•	 What were the terms of your firm’s most recent licensing agreement? (a) Exclu-
sive (b) Non-Exclusive
•	 Prior to your most recent university above collaboration, did you have a rela-
tionship with this university? Yes _____ No _____ Not Applicable ____
•	 Estimate your R&D spending (in USD millions) 2003-2005.
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listed in Ernst and Young’s 2005 Annual Biotechnology Re-
port. The MSA used in this study includes the Census Bureau 
population estimates for July 1, 2006. This cluster variable is 
a predictor where 1 represents cluster-located DBFs and 0 
reflects noncluster DBFs. Licensing term reflects the various 
forms of the licensing agreement. There are two basic forms 
of licensing: exclusive and nonexclusive (Markman, et al., 
2005). An exclusive license gives a DBF sole permission to 
develop a technology. When a DBF acquires a nonexclusive 
license, it may be included in a group of firms that acquire 
a specific technology from a university. This scale includes a 
dummy variable where 1 represents an exclusive license and 
0 reflects a nonexclusive license.
Previous relationship refers to whether a DBF had a prior 
relationship with its most recent university partner. Zahra 
(1996) used this variable when examining technology strat-
egy in biotechnology firms to control for relational benefits 
that accumulate to firms that have a history of trust and 
competency development. This construct is measured using 
a dummy variable that is coded with a 1 if the firm had a 
previous relationship with its most recent university part-
ner and 0 if it did not. R&D intensity is computed by taking 
the ratio of R&D expenditure to the number of employees. 
Many empirical studies have shown university-firm linkages 
positively influence a firm’s inventive performance (Cock-
burn and Henderson, 1998; Zucker, Darby, and Torero, 2002). 
These studies controlled for the R&D investment or scale 
in order to isolate the impact of university collaboration 
and internal research activities on a firm’s inventive process. 
Traditionally, the measure is calculated by dividing the R&D 
investment by spending. However, many biotechnology firms 
do not have any sales; therefore, the number of employees 
is utilized as a means of capturing the scale effect of R&D 
spending. This measure is a log of the ratio of a firm’s total 
spending in R&D versus the number of full-time employees, 
which adjusts for differences in spending based on company 
size (George, Zahra, and Wood, 2002). Table 2 lists the sur-
vey questions.
Results
Table 3 lists the correlations and descriptive statistics for 
the variables used in the current study. The highest relation-
ship in the correlation table is between previous relation-
ship and exclusive licensing (r =.53, p =.01). This relationship 
suggests that DBFs that had a previous relationship with a 
university were more likely to obtain an exclusive licensing 
option, which provides the DBF with sole rights to develop 
and profit from the technology or a quasi-monopoly op-
tion. A university needs to be familiar with a licensee before 
awarding them sole rights to acquire a profit-generating as-
set. Research suggests that familiarity engenders trust (Gu-
lati, 1995).
tion because they capture output from a firm’s technological 
capabilities (DeCarolis, 2003). Innovativeness was measured 
using Deeds’ (2001) assessment of a firm’s exploratory or 
inventive capabilities. The following measure was used dur-
ing hypotheses testing: Early Stage Technology Development 
= Sum (n of patents pending + n of patents approved). The 
patents and patent applications were collected over a 5-year 
period due to the lag between patent applications and pat-
ent approvals. The Chronbach alpha for this measure is 0.81.
Proactiveness refers to a firm’s propensity to be a “leader 
rather than a follower given its willingness and foresight to 
seize new opportunities” (Walter, Auer, and Ritter, 2006, p. 9). 
In the biotechnology industry, this reflects a firm’s ability to 
transform knowledge into commercial products. It includes 
their ability to make it through the clinical trials process. All 
potential drug candidates that can improve human health 
go through a rigorous three-stage clinical trial process. The 
therapy progresses through a small trial that focuses on the 
safety of the drug in Stage I to large-scale testing in Stages II 
and III that assess whether the drug works as intended. To 
measure this dimension, I used Deeds’ (2001) technologi-
cal capability development measure. The following measure 
was used during hypotheses testing: Late Stage Technology 
Development = Sum (n of products in Stage I + n of prod-
ucts in Stage II + n of products in Stage III + n of products 
approved). The Chronbach alpha for this measure is 0.79.
Risk taking is a reflection of the diversity of a firm’s technol-
ogy portfolio (Zahra, 1996). The diversification measure was 
computed using the Blau Index of Variability (Blau, 1977), 
which is often used in alliance studies (Jiang, Tao, and San-
toro, 2010). To determine the diversity of a variable: D = 
1 − −pi2, where D is the degree of diversity, p represents 
the proportion that belongs to a given category, and i is the 
number of different university links. When D is close to 1 
that means the category being assessed is very heterogene-
ous; when D is close to 0 the category is homogenous. To as-
sess a firm’s risk, the respondents were asked to categorize 
the core technologies used in the firm’s projects, in terms of 
using new and existing technologies, and the total number 
of projects in their R&D pipeline. The Chronbach alpha for 
this measure is 0.86.
Control Variables
Age refers to the number of years that have passed since 
the firm was established (Wiklund, 1999). Cluster refers to 
the geographical location of the biotechnology firm (Casper, 
2007). Since the origin of the U.S. biotechnology industry, 
firms have been known to develop around centers of excel-
lence (Chiesa and Chiaroni, 2005). The zip code for each 
response was logged when received and then compared 
to the Metropolitan Statistical Analysis (MSA), or groups of 
zip codes, that represent the top 10 biotechnology clusters 
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censing. The coefficient of innovativeness is negative (B = 
-0.512, p < .10), which suggests that non-innovative firms 
are more likely to select consulting agreements over licens-
ing. Non-innovative DBFs are 1.3 times more likely to select 
consulting agreements over licensing, which is contrary to 
the hypothesized argument. The results show that innovative 
firms seek to license technologies from universities while 
non-innovative firms hire faculty as consultants and sponsor 
faculty research. This hypothesis was partially supported.
Hypothesis 2 asserts that a proactive DBF will be more likely 
to choose licensing agreements and sponsored contract re-
search  over consulting agreements. The results are listed in 
Table 4, Model 2. In Panel 1, the findings show that proactive 
DBFs (B = 0.75, p < .05) are 1.8 times more likely to select 
sponsored contract research over licensing. In Panel 2, the 
analysis reveals that non-proactive DBFs (B = -0.86, p < .05) 
are 2.3 times more likely to select consulting agreements 
over licensing. In other words, as a DBF’s proactiveness in-
creases one unit, it is 2.3 times less likely to select con-
sulting agreements over licenses. As a firm becomes more 
proactive, it is predisposed to select licenses over consulting 
agreements. This hypothesis was fully supported.
Hypothesis 3 proposes that DBFs that are willing to take 
risks are more likely to choose sponsored contract research 
and licensing agreements over consulting arrangements. Ta-
ble 5, Model 1 contains the results, which were mixed. In 
Panel 1, the analysis shows that risk-taking DBFs (B = .42, p < 
.05) are 1.5 times more likely to select sponsored contract 
research over licensing. Contrary to the argument put forth, 
the findings listed in Panel 2 indicate that risk-taking DBFs (B 
= .67, p < .10) are more likely to choose consulting over li-
censing. Those DBFs that are willing to move forward under 
uncertain and ambiguous conditions select modes of tech-
nology transfer that contain high levels of tacit knowledge, 
which is vague because it resides in the scientist’s mind. Risk-
taking DBFs are betting that contract research and consult-
ing will provide them with valuable tacit knowledge that can 
enhance their R&D capabilities.
Finally, Table 5, Model 2 presents the analysis of the full mod-
el that includes all the EO dimensions. In Panel 1, a DBF that 
is risk-taking (B = 0.44, p < .10) and proactive (B = 0.97, p < 
.001) is more inclined to sponsor faculty research than ac-
quire a license. Panel 2 reveals that when all the EO dimen-
sions are present, only proactiveness significantly influences 
a DBF’s selection of consulting agreements over licensing. 
The findings in the full model support Hughes and Morgan’s 
(2007) argument that the EO dimensions do not uniformly 
influence the outcome. In specific context (Lumpkin and 
Dess, 2001) such as deciding whether to acquire a license 
or hire a faculty member as a consultant, the results suggest 
that proactiveness is the dimension that matters. In sum-
Hypotheses Testing
Multinomial logistic regression (MLR) was used to assess the 
hypotheses. MLR is often used to determine the likelihood 
of a DBF selecting a type of university collaboration given 
a specific set of predictors or covariates. This procedure is 
a variation of logistic regression that is used when the de-
pendent variable is categorical and has more than two values 
(Baum, Schwens, and Kabst, 2011). MLR uses a categorical 
variable as the dependent variable, and one of the depend-
ent categories is selected as a reference group. In the cur-
rent study, licensing was selected as the reference category 
because it had the highest frequency among the technology 
transfer modes: licensing (67), consulting agreements (64), 
sponsored contract research (34), not answered/no univer-
sity links (33).
MLR describes how the chance of belonging to a group 
other than the reference category is influenced by predic-
tor variables (Baum, Schwens, and Kabst, 2011). Agarwal and 
Ramaswami (1992) used MLR to examine how ownership, 
location, and internationalization advantages influence the 
choice of foreign market entry mode, and Baum, Schwens, 
and Kabst (2011) used MLR to explore internationalization 
choices in new ventures. Given the use of MLR in previ-
ous studies, this is an appropriate method to evaluate how 
entrepreneurial capabilities help a DBF’s managers decide 
which mode of university technology transfer to select. Ta-
ble 4 presents the results for testing Hypotheses 1 and 2. 
Table 5 lists the analysis for Hypothesis 3 and the full model. 
There are two panels in each table. The first panel lists spon-
sored contract research as the selection that is compared 
to licensing. In the second panel, consulting agreement is the 
selection that is being compared to licensing.
Hypothesis 1 predicts that an innovative DBF will be more 
likely to choose licensing agreements and consulting ar-
rangements over sponsored contract research. The results 
are listed in Table 4, Model 1. In Pane1 1 the coefficient of 
innovativeness is negative (B = -0.54, p < .10), which suggests 
that non-innovative firms are more likely to select spon-
sored contract research over licensing. Examining the “EXP 
B,” which reflects the odds ratio of the predictors, suggests 
that non-innovative DBFs are almost 2 times more likely 
to select contract research over licensing. To rephrase the 
results in language of the hypothesis, a DBF with a higher in-
novativeness score is more likely to prefer licensing to spon-
sored research than DBFs with lower innovativeness scores. 
As hypothesized, innovative firms avoid sponsored contract 
research because they possess the capabilities to conduct 
the research internally.
In Panel 2, the MLR results show that non-innovative DBFs 
are more likely to choose consulting agreements over li-
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N = 171, p*< .05; **p < .01
Table 3. Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlation Matrix.
 Mean Std. Dev. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1. Transfer Modes 1.00 
2. Innovativeness 39.12 58.42 -0.19* 1.00
3. Proactiveness 2.61 3.39 0.26** 0.33** 1.00
4. Risk 0.20 0.18 0.24** 0.03 -0.08 1.00
5. R&D Intensity (Log) 6.6 0.70 0.02 0.03 -0.05 0.03 1.00
6. Age (Log) 0.84 0.30 -0.01 -0.20* 0.15* -0.09 -0.07 1.00
7. Previous Relationship 0.40 0.49 -0.12 0.01 -0.08 -0.07 -0.13 -0.06 1.00
8. Exclusive Licensing 0.80 0.40 -0.04 0.11 -0.05 -0.07 -0.10 -0.17* 0.53** 1.00
9. Cluster 0.74 0.44 0.01 0.10 -0.11 0.01 0.03 -0.09 -0.04 -0.11 1.00
mary, the results fully supported Hypothesis 2 and partially 
supported Hypotheses 1 and 3.
 
Discussion
The purpose of this study was to explore how EO dimen-
sions influence a DBF’s selection of technology transfer 
mode. This goal may appear to be simplistic, but it draws 
attention to DBFs as autonomous organizations that make 
strategic sourcing decisions. This focus on strategic choices 
made by DBFs is important to our understanding of how 
DBFs grow and develop. Many DBFs were formed to com-
mercialize the scientific explorations (Powers and McDou-
gall, 2005) of star scientists (Toole and Czarnitzki, 2007; 
Zucker and Darby, 2001). New DBFs have a limited history 
of collaborations and represent a moral hazard in terms of 
their ability to contribute valuable resources to a partner-
ship (Gulati, 1999). Baum and Silverman (2004) proposed, 
“because startups encounter so many hazards and because 
they have short-track records by which outsiders can evalu-
ate their potential, there is considerable uncertainty about 
their value” (p. 415). These firms rely on their links with 
universities to acquire resources, establish their legitimacy, 
and secure informal university support (Rothaermel and 
Thursby, 2005).
Being unattractive collaboration partners, establishing links 
with universities to acquire resources may be the only op-
tion available to new DBFs. Their inability to secure resourc-
es determines the choices that are available to managers 
(Astley and Van de Ven, 1983). By collaborating with universi-
ties, new DBFs can survive and compete in a rapidly chang-
ing industry. In contrast to this deterministic perspective, the 
strategic choice perspective suggests that organizations are 
not held hostage in a reactive-adaptive prison (Bourgeois, 
1984) where their choices are simply determined by their 
environments (Thompson, 1967). Organizations can and 
do make choices that involve goals, domains, technologies, 
and structural variables (Child, 1972). Conceivably, as DBFs 
make strategic choices to foster their growth and develop-
ment, their relationships with universities change from being 
solely rooted in dependency to supporting goal attainment. 
According to a UTTO director.
Biotechnology firms seek out universities that have resourc-
es that fit their strategic needs. This link depends on the 
uniqueness of the university’s resources and how a firm can 
use them (UTTO director at a university in the U.S. Midwest, 
personal communication, December 27, 2005).
By focusing on selection, my research seeks to connect to 
governance mode selection studies in alliance literature that 
investigate the many ways in which firms can acquire exter-
nal knowledge, each of which reflects firms’ different pri-
orities or circumstances (Van de Vrande, Vanhaverbeke, and 
Duysters, 2009). Because there are unique benefits associ-
ated with specific sourcing strategies (Nicholls-Nixon and 
Woo, 2003), identifying appropriate transfer vehicles should 
enable DBFs to acquire knowledge to support their product 
development activities. This discussion will now summarize 
the results to provide insight on how a DBF’s entrepreneur-
ial orientation influences its transfer mode selection. 
Results Summary
Several insights emerged when reviewing the results of this 
study. First, non-innovative DBFs select technology trans-
fer modes in which they can use the expertise of univer-
sity faculty as a substitute for their lack of R&D capabilities. 
Hypothesis 1 asserts that innovative DBFs would select li-
censing and consulting agreements over sponsored contract 
research. The mixed results revealed that non-innovative 
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Note. Table entries are logistic regression coefficients.
Standard errors are in parentheses; n = 171 (27 out of the total 198 DBFs did not have university links).
*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .001.
Table 4. Multinomial Logistic Regression with Licensing as Reference Category.
Model 1 Model 2
Reference Group
Licensing
Hypothesis 1 Hypothesis 2
Variables B (Std Error) Exp B B (Std Error) Exp B
Controls
 Age (log) 0.69(0.50) 2.00 0.75*(0.53) 1.95
Location 0.67**(0.83) 0.55 1.04**(0.93) 2.54
 Previous Relationship -0.15(0.53) 0.86 -0.29(0.55) 0.65
 R&D Intensity (log) -0.38(0.53) 0.68 -0.08(0.55) 0.64
Panel 1
Contract Research




Control Variables Age 0.260(0.50) 0.80 -0.07(0.48) 0.93
Location 0.45(0.83) 0.60 0.63(0.77) 0.45














Innovativeness -0.51*(0.47) 1.37   










DBFs have a predilection to sponsor faculty research and 
hire academic scientists as consultants. These two technol-
ogy transfer modes use informal communication channels 
such as social interactions to disseminate knowledge (Link, 
Siegel, and Bozeman, 2007). The dissemination of knowledge 
through frequent contact allows DBFs to gain access to and 
leverage faculty members’ absorptive capacity (Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1990), which includes a scientist’s ability, educa-
tional background, and job-related skills (Minbaeva, et al., 
2003). When participating in technology transfer, non-inno-
vative DBFs rely on faculty members to provide them with 
access to new research and discoveries (Lee, 2000). Close 
frequent contact facilitates the development of a common 
language and trust between partners (Mowery, Oxley, and 
Silverman, 2002; Ring and Van de Ven, 1994). These relational 
factors engender knowledge transfer, learning, and the crea-
tion of knowledge (Nonaka and von Krogh, 2009).
Second, proactive DBFs seek to acquire knowledge to create 
an advantage now and sustain it in the future. Hypothesis 2 
states that proactive DBFs should select technology transfer 
modes that promote their ambidexterity by allowing them 
to explore new technologies by sponsoring contract re-
search and exploiting their existing capabilities via licensing. 
Drug development is an arduous task. To adapt to continu-
ously changing environmental conditions, DBFs should ex-
ploit existing competencies and explore new ones because 
these two aspects of organizational learning are inseparable 
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scientist to create new knowledge when solving a problem; 
however, there is no guarantee that (a) the firm can imple-
ment the solution and (b) the solution will work. Licenses 
consist of tangible knowledge that a DBF’s scientists can ex-
plore. Consulting agreements and sponsored contracts in-
volve tacit knowledge that resides in the scientist’s mind and 
is difficult to articulate. Unlike licenses, there is no blueprint 
that helps a DBF’s employees make sense of contract re-
search outcomes and consulting advice. A solution is viable 
only to the extent that a DBF’s employees can make sense of 
and integrate it. This discussion now offers scholarly implica-
tions and implications of how this study influences existing 
transfer practices.
(Floyd and Lane, 2000). Although these two learning modes 
may appear contrary to each other, DBFs have to find a bal-
ance to prevent their capabilities from becoming too rigid 
or outdated. The findings show that proactive DBFs select 
licensing and sponsored contract research, which both sup-
port profit- and capability-generation.
Third, selecting transfer modes that involve a high level of 
knowledge conversion is risky. Hypothesis 3 declares that 
risk-taking DBFs would be more likely to select sponsored 
contract research and licensing over consulting agreements. 
Contrary to the initial assertion, the results suggest that 
consulting agreements might be more of a risk than licensing. 
When participating in consulting agreements, a DBF hires a 
Note. Table entries are logistic regression coefficients.
Standard errors are in parentheses; n = 171 (27 out of the total 198 DBFs did not have university links).
*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .001.
Table 5. Multinomial Logistic Regression with Licensing as Reference Category.
Model 3 Model 2
Reference Group
Licensing
Hypothesis 3 Full Model
Variables B (Std Error) Exp B B (Std Error) Exp B
Control Variables Age (log) 0.67(0.55) 1.95 0.84**(0.57) 2.13
Location  0.93**(0.84) 2.54 1.53***(0.98) 2.42
 Previous Relationship -0.41(0.55) 0.65 -0.08(0.59) 0.02
 R&D Intensity (log) -0.43(0.57) 0.65 0.31(0.62) 0.24
Panel 1
Contract Research
Licensing Term -0.55*(0.59) 0.57 -0.104(0.70) 0.02
Innovativeness -0.86(0.97) 0.80
Proactiveness  0.97***(.061)  2.53
 Risk Taking 0.42**(0.53) 1.65 0.45*(0.56)  2.24
Control Variables Age 0.06(0.49) 1.06 0.35(0.53) 0.70
Location 0.57(0.79) 1.78 1.33***(0.86) 3.78














Innovativeness   -0.37(0.75) 1.46 
Proactiveness
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Managerial implications
A managerial implication draws attention to the role that 
transaction costs play in the transfer mode selection pro-
cess. Transaction costs are costs that arise when purchas-
ing a product or service (Thouin, Hoffman, and Ford, 2009). 
Transaction cost economics (TCE) predicts that DBFs will 
select the mode of university technology transfer based on 
the total costs of the activity: production costs and transac-
tion costs, which include monitoring, controlling, and con-
tract enforcement costs (Holcomb and Hitt, 2007). The goal 
is to select the option with the lowest transaction costs.
When assessing technology transfer modes, it may be nec-
essary for managers to include transaction costs because 
university research contains a high degree of tacitness, which 
hinders research and technology transfer (Howells, 2008). 
A DBF’s employees must make sense of the knowledge in 
order to use it. To do so, managers may assign scientists to 
work closely with a university faculty member (Agarwal, 
2006) to ensure that the firm can acquire and replicate the 
knowledge (Williams, 2007). Since DBFs have limited slack 
resources, other projects may fail to achieve important mile-
stones because their key scientists have been reassigned to a 
technology transfer project. Furthermore, new routines may 
be needed to integrate the new knowledge into the firm’s 
R&D processes. Creating new routines as well as reassigning 
scientists between projects are transaction costs.  
In contractual modes of university technology transfer such 
as sponsored contract research, intellectual property issues 
often arise from misunderstandings about each partner’s 
contribution to the research (Mukherjee et al., 2012). Intel-
lectual property disputes can lead to prolonged legal battles 
that could adversely affect a DBF’s already weak cash posi-
tion (Shane, 2002). Contract monitoring, court costs, and 
legal fees are transaction costs that have the potential to un-
dermine a DBF’s ability to survive as an independent entity.
 Although university knowledge is valuable, there are trans-
action costs associated with acquiring and using it. Another 
implication is that a DBF might benefit from tracking the 
costs associated with brining university knowledge into the 
firm and then using this information to create estimates of 
the transaction costs associated with each mode of technol-
ogy transfer.  Once the estimates  have been established, 
managers can consider the strategic benefits as well as esti-
mated transfer costs when selecting a university technology 
transfer mode.    
Study Limitations and Future Research
There are two limitations of this study. First, interviewing 
UTTO directors and reviewing university-industry studies 
led me to include sponsored contracts, consulting arrange-
Implications
Theoretical implications
This paper puts forth two theoretical implications that 
highlight DBFs’ growth. The first theoretical implication 
highlights an implicit assumption, in the current study, that 
university technology transfer supports a DBF’s growth and 
development. When DBFs participate in technology trans-
fer with universities, they are outsourcing an R&D activity. 
Grimpe and Kaiser (2010) claimed that outsourcing can be 
detrimental to a firm that outsources too many services 
to a single source. The current study found that non-inno-
vative DBFs use university knowledge as a substitute for 
their lack of absorptive capacity. Their reliance might lead 
to their inability to develop an internal knowledge base. A 
firm’s survival, growth, and profitability depend on its ability 
“to establish one or more widely and relatively impregnable 
‘bases’ from which it can adapt and extend its operations 
in an uncertain, changing, and competitive world” (Penrose, 
1995, p. 137). Conversely, innovative firms have more control 
of the resources they need to survive. Research has revealed 
that the ability to control resources improves survival rates 
and the ability to exert influence over dependent firms 
(Alexy, George, and Salter, 2013). For non-innovative DBFs, 
too much reliance on university faculty might negatively in-
fluence their ability to develop technological and scientific 
stocks of knowledge that serve as a platform for growth and 
development.
The second implication describes how a DBF might enhance 
its attractiveness as an alliance partner by selecting a specific 
technology transfer mode. A DBF’s participation in specific 
collaborations influences network actors’ perceptions of 
its capabilities (Baum, Calabrese, and Silverman, 2000). For 
example, when a DBF has prior experience developing a li-
cense, this prior experience sends a signal to potential part-
ners that this firm can successfully develop a product from 
a patent (Coombs and Deeds, 2000). Potential partners rec-
ognize that the amount (and type) of new drugs in a firm’s 
research pipeline predicts the future potential value of the 
company’s scientific capabilities. Selecting a transfer mode 
might enhance a DBF’s legitimacy with potential collabora-
tion partners. Many DBFs lack legitimacy as collaboration 
partners because they suffer from the liabilities of newness 
and smallness (Bruderl and Schussler, 1990; Stinchcombe, 
1965). New and small firms will have legitimacy problems 
until they are perceived as legitimate members of the com-
munity (Hannan and Freeman, 1989). Legitimacy is an im-
portant resource that firms can leverage to gain access to 
resources that are critical to firm growth (Zimmerman and 
Zeitz, 2002). Selecting a favorably perceived technology 
transfer mode might enable a DBF to enhance its legitimacy 
and gain access to resources and partnerships.
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